Regional Fallout: China and Russia's Dilemmas Amidst the Taliban's Rule in Afghanistan

The fall of the Afghan government in August 2021 brought numerous challenges to the people of Afghanistan, the region, and beyond. The escalation of threats stemming from the growth of terrorism, the production and trafficking of narcotics, and the shattered economic structure has turned into a crisis affecting everyone everywhere, regionally and globally. In this article, we explore the extent to which this crisis has gripped the countries in the region.
Before the fall of the Afghan government, the Taliban negotiating team traveled to China, Russia, Iran, and Uzbekistan. These countries, concerned about major issues such as terrorism and extremism in Afghanistan, collaborated with the Taliban. The Taliban made commitments to combat these groups as part of their engagements with these nations.
Now, after more than two years, it has become clear that regional powers such as China and Russia are dissatisfied with the performance of the Taliban. Their demands have not been met, and their security and economic interests in Afghanistan are at risk.
China's most significant security concern stems from the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) that poses a threat from the soil of Afghanistan. Since the first era of the Taliban in 1996, there has been a close relationship between the Taliban and ETIM, as both groups are Muslim, adhere to traditional Hanafi Islam, and share a common goal of establishing an Islamic state. These dependencies and commonalities have kept these ties strong for about three decades. Now that the Taliban have come to power in Afghanistan, China's security concerns have increased. In the initial phase, China sought to establish contact with the Taliban to compel them to prevent ETIM's activities in Afghanistan. It forced the Chinese Foreign Minister to visit Kabul in March 2022, just a few months after the Taliban came to power. At that time, China had no option other than investing in the Taliban and encouraging them to prevent the activities of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement.
The Taliban was seemingly committed to China, as they were seeking strong regional partners to legitimize their newfound power. China maintained its embassy in Kabul, and the Afghan embassy in Beijing was handed over to the Taliban.
Last year, China released a statement outlining its vision for Afghanistan under the control of the Taliban, emphasizing the principles of the "Three Respects" and "Three Nevers." These principles underscore China's commitment to respecting Afghanistan's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Furthermore, China pledges to never interfere in Afghanistan's internal affairs, avoid pursuing selfish interests, and abstain from seeking a so-called sphere of influence. It appears that this statement has not caused the Taliban or persuaded them to engage in regional coordination with China.
However, after the past two years, it appears that China is dissatisfied with the performance of the Taliban. This dissatisfaction has led China as the first sign to abstain from voting on UN Security Council Resolution 2721, adopted on August 29, 2023, indicating a reluctance to exercise its veto power.
On the other hand, Russia is a country that shares a common border with Afghanistan under Taliban rule through Central Asian countries. Afghanistan has about 2300 km border with three Central Asian states: Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan. Undoubtedly, Russia's security interests are also threatened by the soil of Afghanistan.
Terrorist groups primarily rooted in Central Asia continue their activities in Afghanistan under the rule of the Taliban. These include the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and the Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan. These are extremist terrorist groups that can directly pose a threat to Russian soil through Central Asia.
The majority of the approximately 70 million people in the five Central Asian countries (Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan) are Muslim and adhere to the Sunni sect. This similarity can be perceived as a commonality with the Taliban, except for Kyrgyzstan, where a semi-democratic system has recently been implemented, and public voting plays a role in electing the president. Other Central Asian countries are governed by dictatorial regimes that, since gaining independence, have changed presidents only once in the past 30 years. Undoubtedly, such dictatorial regimes contribute to public dissatisfaction, providing a breeding ground for the growth of extremist groups aiming to bring about change. The environment for the growth and activities of these groups in Afghanistan is now conducive, ultimately posing a threat to Russia's security.
Russia encountered a firsthand experience in Afghanistan on September 5, 2022, when a suicide bomber detonated outside the embassy in Kabul, resulting in the tragic loss of two Russian diplomats. The Islamic State – Khorasan Province claimed responsibility for this devastating attack.
The production and trafficking of narcotics in Afghanistan have increased over the past two years, posing another potential threat to Russia. This concern was highlighted by the representative of Russia in the United Nations Security Council before the vote on Resolution 2721, specifically referencing the issue of narcotics.
There are abundant economic potentials in the region, with Afghanistan serving as the best gateway connecting South Asia to Central Asia. Consequently, it could facilitate the transfer of ample energy from Central Asia to South Asia, which is in great need. However, with the rise of the Taliban, none of these potentials are currently being utilized, and international financial institutions such as the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, and others, which previously funded economic projects in Afghanistan, now show no interest in continuing such endeavors. In practice, each passing day sees the waste of these potentials.
China and Russia share numerous interests in Afghanistan under the rule of the Taliban.
• Both countries have no common religious or sectarian ties with the Taliban.
• The security interests of both nations are threatened in Afghanistan.
• The foreign policies of both China and Russia toward Afghanistan have always been conservative. Despite their concerns about the U.S. presence in Afghanistan after 2001, they remained apprehensive about the country's withdrawal. This hesitation led them to refrain from allowing a direct replacement of the U.S. presence in Afghanistan over the past two years.
• The two countries also share a common perspective. Examples include advocating for the release of frozen assets, lifting sanctions, consulting with the Taliban at all decision-making levels regarding Afghanistan at the United Nations. Additionally.
In conclusion, we find that the majority of the repercussions of the fall of the Afghan government in 2021 were perceived by neighboring countries and the region, especially by powerful entities like China and Russia. Security threats have not diminished, but they have increased. Concerns are also heightened regarding the rise in the production and trafficking of narcotics in the region.
China and Russia, which have been consistently concerned about the development of norms such as democracy, freedom of expression, and human rights in Afghanistan over the past 20 years of the previous government, and the possibility of these norms being spread to their own nations have faced a new reality with Afghanistan under the control of the Taliban, which the most dictatorial regime in the region has taken control, therefore is no news of the previous norms, China and Russia must seriously worry about the entry of extremism and terrorism from Afghan soil into their own countries.

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