Acceptance of the Taliban Ambassador by the UAE: Will this political relationship remain?​

In the foreign policy of Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, the head of state of the UAE, there is a prevailing notion that "everything is permissible." This explains the warming of relations between the UAE and the Taliban within this framework.
The UAE primarily seeks to expand economic cooperation and trade with the outside world. This "everything is permissible" approach has turned the country into a safe haven for sanctioned and marginalized individuals with diverse ideological and political affiliations. A key example is its non-compliance with Western sanctions against Russia and its involvement in crises in Sudan, Libya, Yemen, Iraq, Lebanon, and Egypt, and recently, its rapprochement with the Taliban.
The UAE hosts 110 embassies, 75 foreign consulates, and 15 regional and international organizations while maintaining 70 embassies, 11 consulates general, and three permanent missions abroad—an indicator of its efforts to expand international cooperation. Despite these strengths, the UAE faces challenges such as heavy reliance on oil production, lack of a native workforce, difficulties in rapid decarbonization, and extensive dependence on the West, particularly the United States.
In addition, the UAE must address regional instability by countering terrorist groups such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda, maintaining a policy of tolerance toward the Taliban, and navigating territorial disputes with Iran, as well as intense competition with Qatar, a country with many similar characteristics.
The UAE’s relationship with Afghanistan under Taliban rule is largely driven by competition with other actors such as Qatar, Iran, Turkey, and even Saudi Arabia. This policy is being pursued despite unresolved issues such as the assassination of UAE diplomats in Afghanistan and the UAE's support for the West’s war against the Taliban in 2001. Furthermore, UAE engagement with the Taliban could spark competition among Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran, China, and Russia.

UAE’s Recognition of the Taliban Ambassador

In early August 2024, the Taliban’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that Maulvi Badruddin Haqqani, who previously served as chargé d’affaires in Abu Dhabi, had presented his credentials as the group’s ambassador to the UAE's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs for Protocol Affairs.
The acceptance of the Taliban's ambassador in Abu Dhabi could be linked to a meeting between Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed and Sirajuddin Haqqani, the Taliban’s Minister of Interior, who remains on the U.S. terrorist list. This was not the first such interaction; earlier, Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob, the son of Taliban founder Mullah Mohammad Omar and the Taliban’s Minister of Defense, and Mohammad Hassan Akhund had also met the UAE President in Abu Dhabi.
This step marks the beginning of a complex relationship between the UAE and the Taliban. With this move, the UAE becomes the second country after China to establish such close ties with the Taliban. One of the UAE’s key objectives could be countering ISIS, whose Khorasan branch is active in Afghanistan.
Abu Dhabi’s cooperation with the Taliban could help the latter bypass international sanctions, gain global legitimacy, and attract investments in infrastructure, healthcare, mining, and gas exploration projects, as well as security collaborations. The acceptance of the Taliban’s ambassador by Abu Dhabi has not elicited any reaction from Washington or European nations, suggesting that the West might prefer UAE involvement in Afghanistan’s reconstruction as a counterbalance to the influence of Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran.

From Cooperation in Overthrowing the Taliban to Their Recognition

The UAE, along with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, was one of the three countries that recognized the Taliban regime in 1996. However, after the Taliban's collapse in 2001, the UAE took the lead among Arab countries in supporting Afghanistan’s interim government. From 2001 to 2014, the UAE was the only Arab nation with military forces in Afghanistan, actively participating in humanitarian aid efforts.
The 9/11 attacks, in which two Emirati citizens were involved, marked a turning point for the UAE. Realizing the consequences of tolerating extremist groups like the Taliban, the UAE adopted new strategies, including aligning with the U.S. and distancing itself from the Taliban.
Despite this, UAE-Taliban relations persisted in the shadows. For instance, former Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mansour reportedly traveled to the UAE 18 times to secure financial support. Questions about the UAE's motivations in concealing these activities remain unanswered. However, as U.S.-Afghan-Taliban negotiations began under Mansour’s leadership, it likely influenced the Obama administration’s cautious approach to his capture in Dubai.

Conclusion

Three years into their rule, the Taliban have failed to achieve domestic and international legitimacy. The UAE’s increasing engagement with the Taliban, a group facing growing isolation and internal divisions, might change, especially as key Taliban supporters like Islamabad, Tehran, Moscow, and Beijing express dissatisfaction.
Moreover, given the presence of the Taliban’s political office in Doha and the role of Qatar in hosting Western diplomats for Afghanistan affairs, it seems unlikely that the UAE can successfully counter its rivals, especially Qatar, in influencing Afghanistan’s future.